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The susceptibility of deep learning to adversarial attack can be understood in the framework of the
Renormalisation Group (RG) and the vulnerability of a specific network may be diagnosed provided
the weights in each layer are known. An adversary with access to the inputs and outputs could train
a second network to clone these weights and, having identified a weakness, use them to compute
the perturbation of the input data which exploits it. However, the RG framework also provides a
means to poison the outputs of the network imperceptibly, without affecting their legitimate use, so
as to prevent such cloning of its weights and thereby foil the generation of adversarial data.
I. INTRODUCTION
The emerging understanding of deep learning [1–3],
through its analogy with the Renormalisation Group
(RG) [4–6], reveals how its vulnerability to adversarial
attack [7] is directly related to the depth of the layered
network [8]. Successive layers may amplify the sensitivity
of the network to specific small perturbations in the in-
put data, causing it to misclassify the input. Whether a
deep network has this vulnerability depends on the prob-
lem which it is trained to solve and the number of layers.
The RG provides a method for diagnosing if the vulner-
ability exists, using only the trained weights and input
data [8]. However, the same information can also be used
to construct the specific small changes to the input data
that will confuse the network [8]. Thus, it becomes im-
portant to prevent a would-be attacker from acquiring
the weights.
A possible strategy for an attacker with access to the
inputs and outputs of the network would be to use them
to train a clone of the network. The cloned weights could
then be used to expose any vulnerability and to generate
adversarial data. This paper shows how the RG can be
used to poison imperceptibly the outputs of the original
network, so that, if they are used to clone it, the resulting
cloned weights will be wrong and the cloned network will
misclassify some data. The attacker would be able to
discover that the cloning attempt had failed, but would
not be able to rectify it.
In the next section, we summarise the RG framework
for deep learning in the context of a deep network in
which each layer is a Restricted Boltzmann Machine
(RBM) [3] and the network is trained to classify a data
set {x} in terms of outputs {y}, whose exact conditional
probability distribution is p(y|x). In Section III we ex-
tend this framework to incorporate the layerwise train-
ing, which involves a second deep network, built from the
same RBMs, that performs data generation according to
p(x|y). It is the RG analysis of this data-generation net-
work which is used in Section IV to determine how to
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poison the outputs of the original classification network,
so that it cannot be cloned. Finally, in Section V, we
discuss how applicable these RG-inspired methods are
for safeguarding deep learning.
II. RENORMALISATION GROUP FOR
CLASSIFICATION
Consider a layered network of N RBMs with input
nodes h0, N−1 layers of hidden nodes hk, k = 1, . . . , N−
1, and output nodes hN . For example, the hidden nodes
may be binary vectors of the same dimension as the input
data {x} and the outputs {y}, and the joint probability
distribution for the kth layer is of the form [3]
tk(hk,hk−1) =
eh
T
k
Wkhk−1+a
T
k
hk+b
T
k
hk−1
zk
,
zk = Trhk,hk−1e
hT
k
Wkhk−1+a
T
k
hk+b
T
k
hk−1 , (1)
where Wk, ak and bk are weights determined by the
layerwise training, discussed further in Section III.
The trained deep RBM network for the classification
problem, p(y|x), generates the probability distribution
for the output y given input data x, qN (y|x), iteratively
for k = 1, . . . , N through the RG-like transformation
qk(hk|x) = Trhk−1tk(hk|hk−1)qk−1(hk−1|x),
q0(h0|x) = δh0,x,
qN (y|x) ≈ p(y|x), (2)
where, according to Bayes Theorem,
tk(hk|hk−1) =
tk(hk,hk−1)
Trhktk(hk,hk−1)
. (3)
We define the effective Hamiltonian for the kth layer
of this classification network by
qk(h|x) =
e−H
(k)
x
(h)
Z
(k)
x
,
Z(k)x = Trhe
−H(k)
x
(h) (4)
2and parametrise the space of effective Hamiltonians in
terms of a complete set of operators {Oα(h)}, with cou-
plings {gα}. Thus, the effective Hamiltonian for layer k
is
H(k)x (h) =
∑
α
g(k)α Oα(h) (5)
and the effect of the transformation in eq. (2) is to define
{g
(k)
α } solely in terms of {g
(k−1)
α }, for k = 2, . . . , N . This
generates a flow in the coupling-constant space of the
effective Hamiltonians.
The stability matrix for each layer of the network is
defined by
T
(k)
αβ =
∂g
(k)
α
∂g
(k−1)
β
, k = 2, . . . , N (6)
and it may be estimated using the method in [8].
The key assumption we make is that the training of
the deep RBM network converges so that, for N large
enough, the sequence of effective Hamiltonians converges
to a fixed point:
H∗x(h) =
∑
α
g∗αOα(h), (7)
such that
e−H
∗
x
(y)
Z∗x
= qN (y|x) ≈ p(y|x). (8)
The stability properties of the fixed points determine
whether the network becomes sensitive to small changes
in the input data as the number of layers is increased [8].
III. RENORMALISATION GROUP FOR DATA
GENERATION
Using the individual RBMs, tk(hk,hk−1), making up
the layers in the deep classification network in eq. (2), we
can construct a deep generation network iteratively for
k = N, . . . , 1 by effectively reversing the transformation
in eq. (2):
q˜k−1(hk−1|y) = Trhktk(hk−1|hk)q˜k(hk|y),
q˜N (hN |y) = δhN ,y,
q˜0(x|y) ≈ p(x|y), (9)
where, according to Bayes Theorem,
tk(hk−1|hk) =
tk(hk,hk−1)
Trhk−1tk(hk,hk−1)
. (10)
In analogy with eqs (4) - (6), we can define a sequence
of effective Hamiltonians for data generation as follows.
q˜k(h|y) =
e−H˜
(k)
y
(h)
Z˜
(k)
y
,
Z˜(k)y = Trhe
−H˜(k)
y
(h), (11)
for k = N−1, . . . , 0, with couplings {g˜α} to the operators
{Oα(h)} defined by
H˜(k)y (h) =
∑
α
g˜(k)α Oα(h) (12)
and stability matrix
T˜
(k)
αβ =
∂g˜
(k−1)
α
∂g˜
(k)
β
, k = N − 1, . . . , 1. (13)
Layerwise training of the RBMs tk(hk,hk−1), k =
1, . . . , N , may be achieved by minimising the mutual in-
formation,
DKL(Trx,yq˜k(hk|y)qk−1(hk−1|x)p(x,y)||tk(hk,hk−1))
(14)
with respect to the weights in the kth layer, with the
weights in the other layers held fixed, and iterating
to convergence for all of the layers. Here DKL is the
Kullback-Liebler divergence defined for the two proba-
bility distributions p1 and p2 by
DKL(p1||p2) = Trxp1(x) log
[
p1(x)
p2(x)
]
. (15)
For classification, the joint probability in eq. (14) is
p(x,y) = p(y|x)ptraining(x), (16)
where ptraining(x) is the probability distribution for the
sample of classified data, {x}, used for training. The joint
probability for the data-generation problem is similar to
eq. (16) with x and y interchanged.
The assumption that the network in eq. (2) is trained
to perform the classification problem correctly, ensures
that, as k decreases to 0, the sequence of effective Hamil-
tonians for the data-generation problem in eq. (11) also
converges to a fixed point
H˜∗y(h) =
∑
α
g˜∗αOα(h), (17)
such that
e−H˜
∗
y
(x)
Z˜∗y
= q˜0(x|y) ≈ p(x|y). (18)
The stability properties of this fixed point can also be
analysed using the method in [8]. If the stability matrix
in eq. (13) has an eigenvalue bigger than one for small k,
so that the fixed point has a relevant direction, then data
generation is sensitive to small changes in y and these
may be utilised to poison the outputs of the classification
network without affecting their validity for classification.
IV. POISONING THE NETWORK OUTPUTS
The classification network may be protected from
cloning by adding an imperceptibly small perturbation
3δy 6= 0 to each output y, which excites an unstable di-
rection of the corresponding data-generation fixed point
if it is used for data generation, as it would be in training
another network, i.e.,
q˜0(x|y + δy) 6= q˜0(x|y). (19)
The deeper the network, the smaller δy can be to produce
a significant discrepancy in eq. (19). This renders the
mutual information in eq. (14) incorrect for small k, so
that the resulting cloned weights are wrong and, if δy is
small enough, does not affect the use of y + δy as the
classifier.
The perturbation δy which is the strongest poison, i.e.,
produces the largest effect for a given small admixture,
is proportional to the eigenvector of the Fisher Informa-
tion Matrix (FIM) [9] for q˜0(x|y) with the largest eigen-
value [8]. This FIM is given by
F˜
(0)
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′
j
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′))
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=
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(20)
where 〈Oγ〉
(k) is the expectation value of the operator
Oγ with respect to the effective Hamiltonian in layer k,
eq. (11), i.e.,
〈Oγ〉
(k) = TrhOγ(h)q˜k(h|y)
=
TrhOγ(h)e
−H˜(k)
y
(h)
Z˜
(k)
y
. (21)
Having chosen a subspace of operators, {Oα(h)}, in
which to express the effective Hamiltonians in each layer
of the network (via eq. (12)), such that sufficiently pre-
cise estimates of the stability matrix associated with each
layer, T˜
(k)
αβ , in eq. (13) are obtained by the method in [8],
we can compute the FIM using the chain rule:
∂g˜
(0)
α
∂yi
=
∑
β
[
T˜ (1) . . . T˜ (N−1)
]
αβ
∂g˜
(N−1)
β
∂yi
. (22)
Using eqs (9), (11) and (12), the last derivative may be
computed from
e−H˜
(N−1)
y
(hN−1)
Z˜
(N−1)
y
= tN (hN−1|y), (23)
and the explicit form of the RBM for the N th layer,
e.g., using eq. (1) to express yTWNh + b
T
Nh in terms
of {Oα(h)} to determine g˜
(N−1)
β (y).
Thus, the same method used to attack a deep network
with poisoned data [8] may be used by the network to
protect itself from cloning, provided some of the data-
generation fixed points have unstable directions.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have shown how the increasing vulner-
ability of a deep-learning network to adversarial attack
with increasing depth may also provide a means of de-
fence. This applies to a class of deep networks each of
which may be represented by layers of RBMs, trained
individually so that the network solves a classification
problem. The training utilises the same RBMs to con-
struct a data-generation network, with the classifiers as
inputs, and it is the potential sensitivity of this network
to small changes in the classifiers that turns data poison-
ing into a means of defence.
Both the vulnerability to attack and the effectiveness of
the defence are proportional to the depth of the network,
and are reliant on the corresponding RG fixed points (for
classification, or data generation) having a relevant, i.e.,
unstable direction in the space of operators used to define
effective Hamiltonians for each layer.
If the classification fixed points have no relevant direc-
tions, then the network is not susceptible to adversarial
attack and no defence is required. This may be ascer-
tained using the method in [8]. If the classification fixed
point has a relevant direction, there is no guarantee that
the associated data-generation fixed point also has a rel-
evant direction, although this may be determined by the
same method, which then also determines the most ef-
fective way to poison the classification outputs without
affecting their validity as classifiers.
Use of the poisoned outputs to train a clone of the
classification network would cause the cloned network
to classify some data incorrectly. While this would be
readily apparent to a would-be attacker, it could not be
rectified. Unless it can be shown that instability of the
classification fixed point implies instability of the associ-
ated data-generation fixed point, this protection against
cloning is not always available. However, the method
in [8] provides a means of checking both the inherent
vulnerability of a given network and whether poisoning
of its outputs is an effective defence, so that the safety of
the network can be established.
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